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ABSTRACT
As a consequence of the concern over the spread of chemical and biological
weapons which was highlighted by the Gulf War, the U.S. Commerce Department
in 1991, issued new regulations which impose foreign policy controls on exports
from the U.S., and reexports of specified types of chemicals, equipment and
technical data. Most of these items are "dual use" in nature because they have
ordinary industrial uses and capabilities, as well as potential uses for making
chemical or biological weapons. Following a brief discussion of the U.S. export
control regime and its application to exporters operating in other countries, this
article reviews the new regulations, their unprecedented scope, and the concerns
and objections voiced by U.S. industry representatives, all with a view to the
impact that the new controls will have on U.S. industry and foreign companies
dealing with U.S. firms. This article concludes that while it would be impossible
to name a U.S. company that does not support the policy of preventing manufac-
ture of chemical weapons, it would be equally difficult to find such an entity that
does not consider the new regulations, a net to catch the wind because of the lack
of multilateral agreement.
Vain the ambition of kings .. . [who] weave but nets to catch the wind.
John Webster
The Devil's Law Case (1623)
* Mr. Frederick P. Waite is an attorney with Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Washington, D.C,
and Mr. M. Roy Goldberg is an attorney at Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C.
1
Waite and Goldberg: Responsible Export Controls or "Nets to Catch the Wind"? The Comm
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992
194 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Several weeks before allied tanks and troops rolled into Kuwait to
liberate it from the occupying Iraqi forces, President Bush-through his
Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI)-had mobilized govern-
ment agencies in Washington, D.C. to carry out an objective whose gravity
and urgency was highlighted by the danger then facing both allied troops and
neighboring nations of Iraq: namely, to take all steps necessary to ensure that
U.S. industry did not aid non-ally governments, such as that of Iraq, in their
efforts to acquire or enhance the capability to develop, produce, stockpile,
deliver or use chemical or biological weapons.
The U.S. Department of Commerce ("Commerce") responded to the
EPCI by issuing on March 7, 1991, three new regulations which impose new
"foreign policy controls" on exports of specified types of chemicals,
equipment, and technical data, most of which are "dual use" in nature
because they have ordinary industrial uses and capabilities, as well as
potential uses for making chemical or biological weapons.2 Many of these
items are readily available from sources outside of the United States.
The practical effect of the new export controls is that items which
previously could have been exported without any affirmative action by
Commerce may now not be exported unless clearance is obtained from
Commerce through issuance of a validated license. This will often create
significant time delays before exportation can occur, and in some instances
will result in refusal by Commerce to permit exportation of a covered item
to a particular destination.
While the U.S. government has unilaterally promulgated these new
regulations, it has vowed to try to persuade other nations to adopt similar
controls, perhaps as part of a multilateral agreement.' Nevertheless,
issuance of the new regulations prompted an unusually high number of
domestic firms and industry associations (63 in total) to file comments with
Commerce objecting to portions of them.4 The type of industries represent-
ed by the commentators is extremely diverse, ranging from chemical
production to food processor manufacturing to overnight delivery service.
Several of the comments criticized the regulations as being overly broad in
their coverage of chemical precursors and equipment, and complained that
the regulations will be both ineffective in halting the proliferation of chemical
and biological weapons, and deleterious to U.S. competitiveness in
international markets.
1. Fact Sheet on Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, The White House, Office of the
Press Secretary (Dec. 13, 1990). The EPCI was designed to implement Executive Order 12735
of November 16, 1990, which was intended to combat the spread of chemical and biological
weapons.
2. 56 Fed. Reg. 10,756-10,770 (1991). See also 56 Fed. Reg. 40,494-40,502 (1991).
3. See supra note 1; 56 Fed. Reg. 10,756; and discussion, infra.
4. The comments are available for review at the Bureau of Export Administration Freedom
of Information Records Inspection Facility, room 4518, Department of Commerce, Washington,
D.C.
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This article reviews the three new regulations, their unprecedented
scope, and the concerns and objections voiced by U.S. industry represen-
tatives, all with a view to the impact that the new controls will have on U.S.
industry and foreign companies dealing with U.S. firms. We begin our
discussion by briefly examining the U.S. export control regime and its
application to exporters operating in other countries.
I. U.S. EXPORT CONTROL REGIME
All commodities and technical data originating in the United States are
subject to U.S. export control laws-regardless of the owner's nationali-
ty-whenever they are exported from the United States or reexported from
any foreign country to another foreign country. Thus, a French company's
sale of a computer chip to a Taiwanese company would be subject to U.S.
export laws if the chip was produced in the United States United States
export laws also often apply to U.S. components and technical research
which are incorporated into commodities produced outside of the United
States Furthermore, subject to certain exceptions, the U.S. government
generally takes the position that United States controls will apply to a
commodity or technical data which originated in a foreign country and
subsequently was brought to the United States and then reexported without
substantial transformation taking place. This means that U.S. export law
would regulate the exportation from the United States of a chemical produced
in Germany and subsequently warehoused in the United States
While U.S. export laws are implemented and enforced by several
different federal agencies, including the Departments of State, Defense and
Treasury, it is Commerce which, acting through its Bureau of Export
Administration (BXA), administers and enforces the export control program
that most view as especially relevant to commercial exporters.' This stems
from Commerce's control over the export of so-called dual use items, i.e.,
those which have both military and commercial applications.
Most commodities, equipment, and technical data may be exported or
reexported under a "general license," to almost all nations in the world.6
Where this type of license applies, an exporter generally has no obligation
to obtain permission from Commerce before exporting or reexporting the
item. However, certain commodities and technical data may not be exported
or reexported to particular destinations without the exporter applying for and
5. BXA implements the "Export Administration Regulations" ("EAR") 15 C.F.R. §§ 768-
779, 785-791, 799 (1991), which are maintained under the authority of the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1979, ("EAA") as amended, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401, et seq. (1989).
6. Commodities not specifically subject to licensing requirements may be exported to certain
countries under a general license without the need to file an application with BXA. See 15
C.F.R. §§ 771 & 779 (1990).
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receiving an individual validated license (ILV) from Commerce.7
United States law establishes three different types of export controls from
which Commerce may choose in determining whether to impose a "validated
license" requirement for export of a commodity or technical data, and
ultimately whether to deny a request for a validated license: (1) "national
security controls," which "restrict the export of goods and technology which
would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other
... countries which would prove detrimental to the national security of the
United States;"8 (2) "foreign policy controls," which restrict the export of
goods and technology "to further significantly the foreign policy of the
United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations;"9 and (3)
"short supply controls," which are intended to protect the domestic economy
from a drain of goods that are in short supply. 10
As mentioned above, the three new regulations at issue here were
promulgated as "foreign policy controls."1" In the past, Commerce has
imposed such controls to further U.S. interests relating to chemical weapon
development, as well as human rights, missile technology proliferation,
antiterrorism, and regional stability. It also has imposed such controls
against specific countries, such as Libya, Cambodia and South Africa. By
way of contrast, Commerce has imposed national security export controls on
goods and technology that can be used to improve the military capabilities of
certain, primarily Communist, countries.
A validated license requirement at a minimum imposes an administrative
burden and a potentially significant time delay on a U.S. firm desiring to
export any of the chemicals, or on a foreign firm or agent wanting to import
or reexport the chemicals. Note that the applicant for the license should be
the person who has the power and responsibility for determining and
controlling the sending of the commodity or technical data out of the
country. 2 Commerce further requires that the applicant be "subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States," 3 which means that the person must have
sufficient commercial or personal contacts with the United States to ensure
that a U.S. court would have authority to impose sanctions against the
applicant for a violation of U.S. export laws. The U.S. agent of a foreign
person can also submit the application, but in that case the agent becomes the
7. Such a license, which is issued by BXA in response to an application submitted by an
exporter or reexporter, authorizes a specific export or reexport of goods or technology from the
United States or a third country. BXA also issues "special licenses," which authorize multiple
transactions. See 15 C.F.R. § 773.
8. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 (1989).
9. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (Supp. 1. 1988).
10. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406 (1989).
11. See 56 Fed. Reg. 10,756.
12. 15 C.F.R. § 772.3(b) (1988).
13. Id.
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applicant."'
The licensee is held strictly accountable for the use of the license.
Violations of U.S. export control laws may result in a substantial fine and
imprisonment, along with the loss of export privileges. To be liable for
violation of the export laws, a person or firm need not have been an actual
party to a sale of the controlled item. Rather, it is sufficient that the person
or firm have participated in the export knowing it to be unauthorized."5
To document intended use and to ensure that foreign customers are
aware of their responsibilities with respect to the use and disposition of the
items to be exported, the exporter must obtain a Statement by Ultimate
Consignee and Purchaser, Form ITA-629P, unless otherwise exempted. In
some instances, Commerce may require an exporter to obtain from the
importer a Delivery Verification Certificate in which the importer's
government confirms that the licensed commodities have been received.16
Commerce generally has 15 working days, extendable to 30, to either
approve, or with proper notice deny, a validated license.17 Nevertheless,
representatives of the domestic chemical industry have expressed their
concern that the new export regulations could result in delays as long as 90
to 120 days, leading customers to go elsewhere. 8 They add that even a
delay of much shorter duration could cause them to lose a potential sale.19
II. REGULATION OF 50 "PRECURSOR" CHEMICALS
The first new regulation, which although interim nevertheless became
effective on March 13, 1991, implements the President's directive which
requires that a validated license be issued by Commerce before any chemical
on a designated list of 50 may be exported from the United States (or
reexported from a third country if originating in the United States) to any
nation except for the following industrialized nations which makeup the
"Australia Group" Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany,
France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and the
14. Id.
15. 15 C.F.R. § 787.4 (1988).
16. See 15 C.F.R. § 775 (1990).
17. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(o); 15 C.F.R. § 770 (1988).
18. Michael S. Lelyveld, Chemical Exports Seen Hard for U.S. to Control, J. OF COMMERCE,
Mar. 14, 1991, at 3A (statement of Michael Walls, Assistant General Counsel for Chemical
Manufacturers Association).
19. See Comments of The Dow Chemical Company, Mar. 26, 1991, at 2, ECPI Comments
at 2-2 ("If Commerce and State take more than a few days to approve licenses to known
companies for the manufacture of personal care items, household detergents, and common
pesticides, Dow and the U.S. will lose business, profits and the associated jobs").
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United Kingdom.2
Most of the chemicals on the list are not inherently considered to be
chemical or biological warfare agents. Rather, the list of 50 contains many
substances known as "precursor" chemicals because they may be used as
components in the development of the more deadly agents. These chemicals
are thus dual use in nature because they have ordinary industrial uses and
capabilities, as well as potential uses for making chemical or biological
weapons. For example, thionyl chloride, a precursor to the nerve agent
Sarin, is also used in the manufacture of pesticides, dyestuffs and plastics.
Another chemical, arsenic trichloride, is commonly used in electronics
manufacturing but also is part of lewisite, a mustard agent. The list also
includes chemicals widely used for common processes such as electroplating,
fertilizer manufacture and production of heart medicines and other drugs.
Other substances on the U.S. list are commonly used in processes such as
printing and tanning. In addition, while many of the targeted chemicals are
complex, some like sodium sulfide and potassium cyanide are relatively
simple. 21
Prior to this new regulation, 39 of the 50 chemicals could be exported
without a validated license to any nation in the world except Libya, Vietnam,
North Korea, Cambodia, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and military and police
entities in the Republic of South Africa.' Under the new regulation, this
list is greatly expanded to include all of Central and South America, Africa,
and the Middle East, most of the Asian Continent, and many European
nations. Commerce will automatically deny applications for export or re-
export to Iraq, Iran, Libya or Syria.' Permission to ship these chemicals
to other non-Australia Group countries will be considered by Commerce on
a case-by-case basis in reviewing applications for a validated license.
Commerce has stated that exports and reexports to such other nations
20. See 56 Fed. Reg. 10,756. The list of 50 chemicals is as follows: (1) Ammonium hydrogen
fluoride; (2) Arsenic trichloride; (3) Benzilic acid; (4) Chloroethanol; (5) Diethyl ethylpho-
sphonate; (6) Diethyl methylphosphonite; (7) Diethyl-N, N-dimethylphosphoroamidate; (8)
Diethyl phosphite; (9) Diethylethanolamine; (10) N,N-Diisopropyl-.beta.-aminoethane thiol; (11)
N,N-Diisopropyl-.beta.-aminoethanol; (12) N,N-Diisopropyl-.beta.-aminoethyl chloride; (13)
Diisopropylamine; (14) Dimethyl ethylphosphonate; (15) Dimethyl methylphosphonate; (16)
Dimethyl phosphite (dimethyl hydrogen phosphite); (17) Dimethylanine; (18) Dimethylamine
hydrochloride; (19) O-Ethyl-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonite; (20) Ethylphosphonous
dichloride; (21) Ethylphosphonus diflouride; (22) Ethylphosphonyl dichloride; (23) Ethylpho-
sphonyl diflouride; (24) Hydrogen fluoride; (25) 3-Hydroxyl-l-methylpiperidine; (26) Methyl
Benzilate; (27) Methylphosphonous dichloride; (28) Methylphosphonous difloruide; (29)
Methylphosphonyl dichloride; (30) Methylphosphonyl diflouride; (31) Phosphorus Oxychloride;
(32) Phosphorus pentachloride; (33) Phosphorus pentasulfide; (34) Phosphorus trichloride; (35)
Pinacolone; (36) Pinacolyl alcohol; (37) Potassium cyanide; (38) Potassium fluoride; (39)
Potassium hydrogen fluoride; (40) Quinuclidinol; (41) 3-Quinuclidinone; (42) Sodium biflouride;
(43) Sodium cyanide; (44) Sodium fluoride; (45) Sodium sulfide; (46) Thiodiglycol; (47) Thionyl
chloride; (48) Triethanolamine; (49) Triethyl phosphite; and (50) Trimethyl phosphite. 56 Fed.
Reg. 10,758.
21. Lelyveld, supra note 18, at IA.
22. 56 Fed. Reg. 10,756.
23. Id.
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generally will be approved unless there is reason to believe the chemicals will
be used to produce chemical or biological weapons or otherwise devoted to
such improper purposes. '
A factor that has already sparked controversy over the efficacy of the
new regulation is that many of the 50 chemicals are readily available from
other countries, even those outside the Australia Group. Not surprisingly,
several United States companies and industry associations, in comments
submitted to Commerce regarding the new regulation, asserted that in order
to be effective at curbing the proliferation of chemical and biological
weapons, the export controls on chemical precursors must be applied on a
multilateral basis.' These industry representatives are concerned that "the
costs and delays of the licensing process [will] hurt the competitiveness of
U.S. companies vis-a-via foreign producers and that the unilateral controls
[will] prove ineffective due to the widespread foreign availability of the
controlled items."' Almost all added their belief that other nations would
not join in a multilateral agreement.
At least with respect to the Australia Group, the U.S. firms may be
overly pessimistic. In late May 1991, the Australia Group met to consider
the new U.S. controls, and as a result of that meeting, it now appears that
all of the other Australia Group members that do not already control all 50
precursors will soon do so.27 Significantly, however, any Australia Group
agreement does not bind non-member chemical-producing nations. A
Commerce report sent to Congress on March 7, 1991, acknowledged that 25
of the 39 chemicals are manufactured outside Australia Group countries,
while 14 of the chemicals are manufactured in the non-Australia group
countries of Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, India,
Israel, Mexico, China, Peru, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Taiwan and the
Soviet Union (now the Commonwealth of Unified States). Moreover, any
country, such as Iraq, that can make its own matches, fertilizers, cleaners or
munitions already has the technology to produce many chemicals on the
list.2
24. Id.
25. According to Commerce, "[t]wenty-three commentators criticized the fact that the proposed
rule contained unilateral export controls." 56 Fed. Reg. 40,495 (Aug. 15, 1991).
26. 56 Fed. Reg. 40,495-40,496 (1991).
27. See 19 Nations Back U.S. Plan For Chemical Arms Curbs; "Australia Group" Agrees to
Export Controls, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 31, 1991, at Al, A9. According to the article,
U.S. chemical manufacturers "hailed the agreement" because it would help ensure that "'there
will be harmonized controls on the export of these chemicals.'" (quoting Michael Walls, attorney
for Chemical Manufacturers Association).
28. One industry representative noted that "much of the ingredients and equipment needed to
foster a chemical weapons program are widely available from global sources, including those
countries not participating in the Australia Group." Comments of the American Association of
Exporters and Importers, Apr. 12, 1991, at 1; see also Comments of the Industry Coalition on
Technology Transfer (ICOTI), Apr. 8, 1991, at 2 ("many of the chemicals in question are
available far beyond the borders of the Australia Group"); Comments of American Electronics
Association, Apr. 12, 1991, at 2 ("[Ilt appears that we are doomed to repeat the mistakes of the
7
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This may be where the "foreign availability" rule comes into play.
Pursuant to this rule, the availability of a chemical precursor from another
nation eventually could force Commerce to grant a validated license for the
export of a substance. Under U.S. law, the President is authorized to impose
or expand foreign policy export controls only if, among other requirements,
the controls "are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy purpose, in
light of [several] factors, including the availability from other countries of the
goods or technology proposed for such controls, and that foreign policy
purpose cannot be achieved through negotiations or other alternative
means."2
The law further requires that the President, in applying foreign policy
export controls, "take all feasible steps to initiate and conclude negotiations
with appropriate foreign governments for the purpose of securing the
cooperation of such foreign governments in controlling the export to
countries and consignees to which the United States export controls apply of
any goods or technology comparable to goods or technology controlled under
this section."' It adds that "[i]f, within 6 months after the date on which
[foreign policy export controls] are imposed or expanded.., the President's
efforts under paragraph (1) are not successful in securing the cooperation of
foreign governments ... [Commerce] shall thereafter take into account the
foreign availability of the goods or technology subject to the export
controls." 3" If Commerce affirmatively determines that a good or technolo-
gy subject to the export controls is available in sufficient quantity and
comparable quality from sources outside the United States to countries
subject to the export controls so that denial of an export license would be
ineffective in achieving the purposes of the controls, then Commerce must,
"during the period of such foreign availability, approve any license
application which is required for the export of the good or technology and
which meets all requirements for such a license." Moreover, Commerce
must "remove the good or technology from the list . . . if the Secretary
determines that such action is appropriate."
The rationale behind the "foreign availability" rule is that where such
availability exists, U.S. export controls are not effective, and the practical
consequence of such controls is to harm U.S. businesses who are prevented
from competing for the foreign sale. Some have even suggested that United
States national security is actually threatened by such ineffective controls
because they have a potentially deleterious effect on U.S. industry. Thus it
is understandable that U.S. companies and industry representatives in
past by acting unilaterally and imposing controls on a range of goods and technology widely
acknowledged as being available outside the U.S. and Australia, Missile Technology and London
Supplier groups. Such unilateral and overreaching action could seriously undermine U.S. efforts
to strengthen the current nonproliferation regimes.").
29. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b)(l)(A) (emphasis added).
30. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(h)(1).
31. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(h)(3).
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comments submitted to Commerce requested that the foreign availability
doctrine be applied to the new regulations. 2
Several commentators also requested Commerce to establish a new
general license or special license that would permit exports to affiliates or
licensees of U.S. companies. 3 Commerce has responded by promising to
issue a separate rule "that creates a special licensing procedure for exports
of chemicals. . . to subsidiaries or other affiliates under the effective control
of a U.S. exporter.'
III. REGULATION OF EQUIPMENT AND TECHNICAL DATA
RELATED TO CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
The second new regulation published by Commerce, which is also
interim but became effective March 13, 1991, is not directly aimed at
controlling the export of certain chemicals. Rather, it is intended to prevent
further development of chemical and biological weapons by imposing foreign
policy controls on exports of certain types of equipment, and of technical
data relating to the production of such equipment, that can be used to
produce chemical or biological agents that are themselves regulated by either
the Commerce Department's Export Administration Regulations (EAR) or the
State Department's International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).35
The new regulation imposes export controls on 12 specified types of dual
use equipment, and related technical data, which have both legitimate
commercial uses and potential capabilities for chemical and biological
weapons production. Included on the list of equipment are such innocuous-
sounding items as "pumps or valves designed to be vapor leak proof,"
"thermometers or other chemical processing sensors encased in nickel alloy,"
and "chemical processing equipment lined with nickel or constructed with
Hastelloy, Monel, or another alloy with nickel content."'
32. Commerce has promised to "reevaluate" the controls annually in light of the foreign
availability rule. 56 Fed. Reg. 40,496. At least one industry representative already has urged
Commerce to conduct a foreign availability analysis for the precursors and equipments subject
to the new regulations. Comments of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Apr. 12, 1991,
at 11-12.
33. See, e.g., Comments of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Apr. 12, 1991, at 13
(criticizing the chemical precursor controls for not providing an exemption or expedited licensing
process for exports destined for end-use by subsidiaries, affiliates or joint ventures of U.S.
organizations).
34. 56 Fed. Reg. 40,495.
35. See 56 Fed. Reg. 10,760.
36. The complete list of controlled equipment is as follows: (1) Chemical processing
equipment lined with nickel or constructed of Hastelloy, Monel, or another alloy with nickel
content; (2) Pumps or valves designed to be vapor leak proof; (3) Thermometers or other
chemical process sensors encased in nickel alloy having a nickel content greater than 40%; (4)
Filling equipment enclosed in a glove box or similar environmental barrier, or incorporating a
nickel-lined or hastelloy nozzle; (5) Specially designed incinerators for chemical precursors listed
in the previously discussed new regulation, chemical warfare agents, or organophosphorus
compounds; (6) Toxic gas monitoring systems; (7) Monitoring systems for the detection of
9
Waite and Goldberg: Responsible Export Controls or "Nets to Catch the Wind"? The Comm
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992
202 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
The scope of this regulation is unprecedented. Never before have export
licenses been required for such dual use equipment. Domestic companies
and industry organizations asserted in comments filed with Commerce that
the equipment may be used for such non-military uses as the manufacture of
peanut butter, salad dressing and candy. One industry representative
contended that the regulation applies to literally all reactors, storage tanks,
heat exchangers, distillation columns and degassing equipment now in
common use in the commercial chemical industry, and that some of the
equipment-notably heat exchangers and degassing equipment-have
important civil applications in food production and medical care. Another
industry group asserted that the term "chemical processing equipment" could
be interpreted to include "virtually any equipment associated with chemical
production," and that the new regulation "[c]ontrolling 'pumps or valves'
designed to be vapor proof' is overbroad because virtually all civilian end-use
valves today are designed to meet that criterion."37
However, the geographic coverage of this regulation is not as broad as
the one imposing controls on the chemical precursors. Rather than requiring
a validated license for export to all but the nations within the Australia
Group, this new regulation requires a validated license for export of such
equipment and technical data listed to Libya, North Korea, Vietnam,
Cambodia and Cuba, and to all countries designated as part of either the
Middle East or Southwest Asia.3" For purposes of the regulation, the
Middle East region includes Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emerites,
and Yemen. 9 Southwest Asia, in turn, includes Afghanistan, India, Iran
and Pakistan.'
Commerce has stated that licenses for exports and reexports of such
equipment and technical data will be denied if Commerce believes that such
equipment or technical data would make a material contribution to the
design, development, production, stockpiling or use of chemical or biological
weapons.41 Factors to be considered with respect to individual applications
include:
1. The specific nature of the end-use;
chemical compounds having anticholinesterase activity; (8) Detection or assay systems that are
capable of detecting concentrations of less than one part per million in air of biological agents
or toxins controlled under the EAR; (9) Biohazard containment equipment; (10) Equipment for
the microencapsulation of live microorganisms; (11) Intermediate chemicals used in the
production of chemical warfare agents; and (12) Complex media (specifically brain/heart infusion
media) for the growth of microorganisms in Class 3 or Class 4, in quantities greater than 100
kilograms. See 56 Fed. Reg. 10,760.
37. Comments of ICOTT, Apr. 8, 1991, at 3.
38. 56 Fed. Reg. 10,760.
39. See 56 Fed. Reg. 10,761; 15 C.F.R. § 770.2 (1990).
40. Id.
41. 56 Fed. Reg. 10,760.
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2. The significance of the export in terms of its contribu-
tion to the design, development, production, stockpil-
ing, or use of chemical or biological weapons;
3. The non-proliferation credentials of the importing
country; and
4. The types of assurances or guarantees against the
design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of
chemical or biological weapons that are given in a
particular case.42
In comments filed with Commerce, a U.S. industry association asserted
that the regulation on equipment and technical data would "put U.S. food
processing machinery and equipment manufacturers at a significant
competitive disadvantage," which would "reduce the exports of U.S.
manufacturers of food processing equipment. . ."I The commentator
complained that "[w]ith significant foreign availability of the subject
machinery and equipment, these export controls ... will not stop the ability
of suspect nations to develop chemical and biological weapons," but would
nonetheless stop the export from the United States "of some food processing
machinery which is totally unrelated to the production of chemical and
biological weapons."" This is because even if a license ultimately is
granted, "[t]he extended period for license processing will push the
manufacturer's delivery date beyond that required in its contract and thereby
force it to incur substantial financial penalties."' 5 The commentator added
that "[clustomers in foreign countries will not accept the delays and other
burdens imposed by these export controls because alternative sources of
supply are available from many foreign countries."' The organization
further predicted that "[i]n selling their products to foreign customers,
foreign manufacturers will emphasize the delays and uncertainties created by
the Interim Rule that would burden any contract with a U.S. manufactur-
er. "47
Several other representatives from the U.S. pump and valve manufactur-
ing industry objected to the inclusion on the list of "pumps or valves
designed to be vapor leak proof." A commentator from the food processor
manufacturing industry contended that the regulation is so broad that it
applies to pumps used by the food processing industry "in the process of
tomatoes, beer, wine, peanut butter, candy, salad dressing, milk, bakery
42. 15 C.F.R. § 776(b)(2).
43. Comments of the Food Processing Machinery and Supplies Association (FPM&SA), Apr.
9, 1991, at 1.
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id. at 2.
46. Id. at 3.
47. Id. at 2-3.
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products, and a wide variety of other foods." 48 A manufacturer of valves
for use in petrochemical, chemical and fertilizer plants complained that it will
now face greater competition from European rivals not subject to the delay
from the validated license requirement.4 9
Many commentators also emphasized that chemical and biological weap-
ons could be manufactured without the equipment listed in the regulation.
As one commentator stated, "restriction of equipment made from optimal
materials of construction can only prevent the building of long-life CBW
[chemical and biological weapon] manufacturing facilities." 51 It added that
"[m]any commonly available materials, such as glass, painted carbon steel,
and plastic, will last long enough to produce sufficient" chemical and
biological weapons to be effective. 5'
As with the chemical precursor regulation, several commentators com-
plained that the controls would be ineffective because they were not part of
a multilateral agreement.5 2  The commentators further noted that the
chances for such an agreement were very slim. This prediction has so far
proven correct, in that no other Australia Group member has yet adopted the
U.S. approach. One commentator observed that the Australia Group rejected
similar equipment controls merely 18 months before the new regulations
were issued. 53
IV. REGULATION OF EXPORTS DESTINED TO AID DEVELOPMENT OF
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND MISSILES
The third new regulation is in at least one respect much broader in scope
than the first two. This regulation-which initially was issued as a proposed
regulation,' but was subsequently reissued in amended form as an interim
regulation, effective August 15, 1991, 55-applies to exports of all commodi-
ties, equipment, technical data, software and personal services for which a
validated license is otherwise required, unless the only reason for requiring
a validated license is because the item is in short supply in the United States
The regulation authorizes Commerce to deny a validated license application
if the export could be destined for the design, development, production, or
use of missiles or chemical or biological weapons, or for a facility engaged
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id.
50. Comments of Dow Chemical Company, Mar. 26, 1991, at 3 (emphasis in original).
51. Id.
52. One commentator specifically requested that "[b]ecause the equipment on the interim
control list is widely available throughout the world, . . . an exemption [should] be allowed
where foreign availability has been established." Comments of FPM&SA, supra note 43, at 3.
53. Comments of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Apr. 12, 1991, at 4.
54. 56 Fed. Reg. 10,765-10,770.
55. 56 Fed. Reg. 40,494.
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in such activities. 56
The regulation also imposes foreign policy controls on exports to
specified destinations when the exporter either "knows" or has been informed
by the Department of Commerce's Office of Export Licensing (OEL), that
the commodities, technical data, or software will be used in the design,
development, production or use of missiles or chemical or biological
weapons, or are destined for a facility engaged in such activities. Further,
a U.S. person may not, without a validated license, perform any contract,
service, or employment knowing that it assists such activities. The
prohibition extends to support of any such transactions, through financing,
freight forwarding, or other comparable activities. Notably, the term "U.S.
person" includes foreign branches of companies organized in the United
States The proposed regulation is also specifically intended to prohibit U.S.
persons from participating in the construction of plants to produce chemical
weapon precursors in certain countries.
Thus, under the new regulation, Commerce may inform an exporter at
any time that a validated license is required for a specific export or reexport
transaction or for exports or reexports to a specific end-user because there
is an unacceptable risk that such shipments will be used in sensitive nuclear
activities, in the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of
chemical or biological weapons, or in the design, development, production
or use of missiles.5 7 An exporter may be individually informed by Com-
merce, or Commerce can publish a notice in the Federal Register." When
individual notice is provided orally, it is to be followed by a written notice
within two working days signed by the Commerce's Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Export Administration. 9 However, the absence of any such
notification does not excuse the exporter from compliance with the validated
license requirements imposed by the regulation.'
To summarize, the proposed regulation would impose new licensing
requirements whenever:
1. An export of a whole chemical plant that manufactures any of the
50 chemical precursors listed in the first new regulation, or assis-
tance in designing such a plant, is destined to any country outside
the Australia Group;
2. A U.S. person knows that a proposed export or other assistance is
destined for chemical or biological weapon or missile activities in
listed regions, countries or projects; or
3. A U.S. person is informed by the U.S. Government that a pro-
56. Id.
57. See 56 Fed. Reg. 40,494-40,498; 15 C.F.R. §§ 778.7, 778.8 (1988).
58. 56 Fed. Reg. 40,494.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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posed export or other assistance is destined for chemical or bio-
logical weapon or missile activities anywhere in the world.
Unlike the earlier proposed regulation, the interim regulation does not
contain a definition of the term know. Those in need of a definition should
consult other government regulations and case law, and should use their
common sense. Businesses should also be on notice that at least some
Commerce officials have indicated their belief that the interim regulation
imposes an affirmative duty on exporters to inquire as to the end uses of their
overseas shipments.
One commentator suggested that the imposition of a validated license
requirement on exporters who are informed by Commerce that a validated
license is required for exports to identified consignees was prompted by
Commerce's desire "to control exports to particular end users without either
(1) warning them that the U.S. Government is aware of their misconduct or
(2) compromising intelligence sources and methods that may have contributed
to the government's knowledge of such misconduct."61 This commentator
was opposed to "a regime under which the Commerce Department informs
some, but not all exporters selling to a particular end user that such sales are
prohibited." 62 It asserted that:
Aside from the obvious inequity of placing restrictions on some
exporters that are not imposed on others, the rationale of this
approach is wanting. In an open society such as ours, a government
notification of this type will not long remain secret. Indeed, it will
be in the interest of the recipient of such a confidence to shout the
information from the rooftops to ensure that its competitors cannot
take advantage of its unilateral knowledge. The government must
accept that, as one cannot be a little bit pregnant, one cannot
disclose information about questionable end users to some exporters
without having that information become general public knowledge
in short order.'
A metalworking electronics corporation complained in its comments to
the proposed regulation that incorporation of U.S. components would restrict
the end uses of the finished product and that overseas sales agents would
have to devote staff to review periodic changes in denied users and inform
their worldwide sales networks of these changes." The commentator
further stated that "[g]iven that producer countries of high technology
commodities, like Taiwan, will not have these restrictions, and that countries
61. Comments of ICOlT, Apr. 8, 1991, at 5.
62. Comments of ICOTT, Sept. 16, 1991.
63. Id. at 2, quoting Comments of ICOTT, Apr. 8, 1991.
64. Comments of Anilam Electronics Corporation, Apr. 1, 1991, at 1.
[Vol. 22
14
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 2 [1992], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol22/iss2/2
1992] RESPONSIBLE EXPORT CONTROLS OR "NETS TO CATCH THE WIND"? 207
like Germany may not fully implement them, there can be no doubt that a
serious erosion in foreign markets for U.S. goods will develop. " O
Commerce also was criticized by an industry association for failing to
publish a list of projects simultaneously with the new controls on missile
exports.' The association asserted that "[tihe absence of a list unfairly
requires exporters to second guess BXA's designation of projects which are
of concern for proliferation reasons," and complained that companies wishing
to comply could not "make the necessary improvements to their internal
compliance programs until such list is made public."67
V. THE NEW REGULATIONS AND "CONTRACT SANCTITY"
United States law generally requires Commerce to permit exporters to
fulfill contracts to which they have entered into prior to the establishment of
new foreign policy controls, unless the President determines that there has
been a breach of the peace. This is referred to as "contract sanctity." While
the first two new interim regulations (concerning chemical precursors and
equipment) have provisions guaranteeing contract sanctity," Commerce has
indicated that because of the serious threat presented by proliferation of
chemical and biological weapons, it is seriously contemplating the elimination
of the contract sanctity provisions in the final regulations.'
For the third regulation (concerning commodities, equipment, technical
data, software and personal services for which a validated license is
otherwise required) Commerce stated that "contract sanctity as a principle is
maintained," and listed contract sanctity dates for various countries, but
warned that while "cases may arise in which contract sanctity is inappropriate
in light of the serious concerns raised by missiles and chemical and biological
weapons."' Commerce added that "[a]ccordingly, there will not be a
presumption of approval for license applications involving pre-existing
contracts; [rather] the existence of a pre-existing contract will be treated as
a factor to be considered in reviewing license applications."71
Industry representatives are very concerned about the potential lack of
contract sanctity. They fear that Commerce's approach to contract sanctity
"will require that all shipments under preexisting contracts be submitted to
Commerce for consideration on a case by case basis," and that "[g]iven the
emotional and political controversy that surround the proliferation area," it
65. Id.
66. Comments of Aerospace Industries Association (AlA), Sept. 12, 1991, at 1. "Supplement
No. 6," entitled "Missile Technology Projects," was included in the August 15, 1991, Federal
Register notice, but did not identify any projects.
67. AIA Comments, supra note 66, at 1.
68. See 56 Fed. Reg. 10,756, 10,760.
69. Id.
70. 56 Fed. Reg. 40,496.
71. Id.
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is doubtful "that the Department will be prepared to go on record as
approving such exports."'
VI. CONCLUSION
As impossible as it would be to name a U.S. company or industry
representative that does not publicly support the President's policy of
preventing the totalitarian dictators and terrorists of the world from acquiring
or further developing the capacity to manufacture chemical or biological
weapons, it would be equally difficult to find such an entity that does not
consider Commerce's three new regulations implementing this policy to be,
in effect, a net to catch the wind because of the lack of a multilateral
agreement with nations whose companies-in competition with U.S.
firms-produce and export the same types of chemicals, equipment and
related data covered by the new regulations.
The burden imposed upon U.S. industry by the new regulations cannot
be overestimated. Domestic companies must now face a validated license
requirement which many of their foreign competitors do not. The fear of
U.S. industry is that the uncertainty as to whether a license will be granted,
and the delay caused by the licensing process, will cause foreign purchasers
to look to foreign competitors for supply of the chemical precursors and
equipment that are subject to the regulations. Nor is the burden limited to
companies which manufacture or sell chemicals. As clearly demonstrated by
the number and diversity of companies and organizations submitting
comments with Commerce, the new regulations apply to a wide range of
industry sectors.
Finally, while only U.S. companies and organizations submitted com-
ments to Commerce regarding the new regulations, it is clear that some
foreign producers of the chemical precursors and equipment covered by the
new regulations also will be affected. Commodities and technical data which
originated in the United States, or in some instances merely were stored in
the United States, are subject to the laws-regardless of the owner's
nationality-whenever they are exported from the U.S. or reexported from
any foreign country to another foreign country. Accordingly, a foreign
company's export or reexport of an item covered by the regulations will be
subject to the validated license requirement if either a completed item or a
non de minimis component thereof was produced or warehoused in the U.S.
72. Comments of ICOTT, Sept. 16, 1991, at 1; see also Comments of Anilam Electronics
Corp., Apr. 1, 1991, at 2. ("Because the sanctity of contracts with U.S. producers will no
longer be honored, American products will be much less desirable. At any time, [the Office of
Export Licensing] could inform an exporter personally or by publication in the Federal Register
that shipments must be halted. What foreign manufacturer would want to purchase U.S.
components when his supplies could be cut off at any time?") EPCI Comments 5-2;
("[ellimination of the contract sanctity provision could result in the financial ruin of small
companies and substantially undermine the financial viability of medium sized companies")
Comments of FPM&SA, supra note 43, at 3.
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